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This paper analyzes possible justifications for government interventions in
health and old age insurance and illustrates the theoretical considerations by
the case of Chile where a comprehensive social sector reform took place in
the 1980s. It is shown that health insurances can suffer from adverse
selection and risk selection as well as from moral hazard. In dealing with
adverse selection and risk selection, governments can choose between social
insurance and regulated private insurance, depending on the relative weight
given to equity and efficiency. The problem of moral hazard can be
diminished by various supply and demand side cost-sharing devices. With
respect to old age security, the case for the system of forced savings
prevailing worldwide mainly relies on the hypothesis that people tend to
undersave for retirement. Among the possible pension schemes, funded
systems are likely to have advantages over PAYG systems in that they
improve efficiency.
JEL-Classification: G22, H55,118I. INTRODUCTION
There is now a widespread consensus - at least among economists - that
governments in developing countries (DCs) should adopt a market-oriented
approach to foster economic development. It is much less evident which role
social policy has to play in such an approach. Broadly defined, including
education, health care, old age security, unemployment benefits, and various
social allowances, social policy can serve three basic objectives (Barr 1993):
(i) poverty alleviation and the reduction of inequality;
(ii) human capital formation;
(iii) economic security.
The first objective, with its emphasis on equity, is likely to come into
conflict with economic growth because redistribution on a significant scale
requires high taxation and distorts incentives, but there also may be some
positive links between equality and growth as a number of recent papers has
shown (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1996, Perotti 1996; Persson and Tabellini
1994). In the field of human capital formation, the main task of governments
is to complement the market, e.g. by subsidizing basic education where
externalities prevail. With respect to economic security, which includes
insurance against risks like illness and unemployment and the smoothing ofincome through savings for old age consumption, it is least obvious why
and, if yes, how the state should intervene. The present paper, therefore,
focuses on this third objective of social policy. Since unemployment
insurance is largely limited to OECD countries (World Bank 1995) the
discussion will be limited to health insurance (Chapter II) and old age
security (Chapter III). For both insurances, efficiency and equity arguments
for state involvement will be analyzed in order to assess the different
possible policy options. The analysis will be illustrated by the case of Chile
where a comprehensive social sector reform took place during the 1980s.
Chile's reforms are largely in line with theoretical reasoning and may thus
provide valuable insights for other potential reformers.
II. HEALTH INSURANCE
Health expenditures tend to increase in the course of economic development
(Table 1). In low and lower-middle-income countries health spending on
average absorbs about 4 percent of GDP. This share rises to 6-9 percent in
most OECD countries. Prominent outliers are the United States where
almost 13 percent of GDP are spent for health care, and Singapore with a far
below-average share of 2 percent (Musgrove 1996). Interestingly, private
health expenditures as a percentage of GDP are roughly constant acrossincome levels whereas public expenditures increase. Rising demand for
health care is thus largely met by the public sector.



























Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (1993) and Musgrove (1996).
The bulk of health expenditures, usually over 90 percent, is devoted to
clinical services (ibid.). Many of these clinical interventions are too costly to
be paid out-of-pocket. The consequence is that risk averse individuals have
an incentive to pool their risks in insurances. As Table 2 indicates, the
demand for insurance tends to be income-elastic. In low-income countries,
only small minorities of the population are covered by insurance
arrangements, e.g. less than 10 percent in most of Sub-Saharan Africa (Shaw
and Griffin 1995). Out-of-pocket payments still account for more than half
of total health spending. In the middle-income countries, there are broadly
two types of health systems, distinguished by whether the government or theprivate sector provides insurance. Where insurance is private, it is usually
limited to upper income groups, while in countries with social insurance
middle-class workers tend to be covered as well. In the industrialized
economies, with the prominent exception of the United States, universal or
near-universal coverage has been achieved, financed partly through general
tax revenues and partly through social insurance.
1. The Rationale for Government Intervention
Insurance against health risks raises two difficulties which both have their
origin in an asymmetric distribution of information between consumers and
insurers: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection arises when
insurers cannot distinguish high- from low-risk individuals. With perfect
information, insurers would charge different premiums depending on
individual riskiness and thereby ensure a pareto optimal outcome. Where the
insurance company cannot observe individual risks, it must charge a
premium based on average risk. Facing such a contract, low-risk individuals
would drop out. In the next round, insurers would have to increase premiums
in order to avoid losses resulting from the deteriorating average risk profile
of their customers which would again lead to a drop-out of those with











- High private out-of-pocket spend-
ing for traditional medicine and for
drugs
- Public services financed from
general revenue
- Little Insurance (usually less than
10 percent of population)
- Government services for low- and
middle-income groups financed
from general revenue
- Private voluntary insurance and
private provision for high-income
groups (less than 20 percent of
population)
- Public health and clinical services
for low-income groups financed
from general revenues
- Social Insurance for wage labor
force, with mixed provision
(coverage varies; nearly universal in
Costa Rica and Korea)
- Universal or near-universal cover-
age through general revenue financ-
ing or compulsory social insurance
- Use of capped third-party payments
and global budgets
- Voluntary private employment-
based insurance
- Use of general tax revenues for
Medicare and Medicaid
- Unregulated and open-ended fee-
for-service compensation
- High administrative costs associated
with health provision and insurance
aThe systems of former socialist economies are not included
Examples
Bangladesh, Paki-













Source: Adapted from World Bank (1993).This process would end up in a breakdown of the insurance market (Spefice
1978). But it seems realistic to expect a market response to the problem of
adverse selection. First, insurers can offer separate contracts, e.g. one with
full insurance and one with partial insurance, which face potential customers
with incentives to reveal their true risk status (self selection). In such a
setting, there exists a market equilibrium between the two polar cjis.es of
perfect information and complete adverse selection. This can be illustrated
by means of Figure 1. With perfect information, (CH,CL) represents the
pareto-efficient full insurance equilibrium which separates high from low
risks. 1 If.information is imperfect, the pooling equilibrium A is not stable
because low risks have an incentive to opt out. With differentiated contracts,
however, a separating equilibrium (Pn,CL) can be established where high
risks are indifferent between full and partial insurance and thus have no
longer an incentive to conceal their true risk. This equilibrium is necessarily
pareto inferior to the benchmark of perfect information because high-risk
individuals whose risk status cannot be observed directly and who therefore
benefit from an information advantage will only be ready to reveal their true
Under perfect information, risk averse individuals choose full insurance unless there
are significant administrative costs which drive up premiums above the acturarial level
(Barr 1993).risk status if they are subsidized by low risk individuals. The result is that
the latter are worse off than under perfect information, paying higher
premiums while choosing only partial insurance, i.e. a less than efficient
amount of coverage (ibid.). Second, insurers have the possibility to collect
information, e.g. via obligatory medical checks, in order to identify the risk
status of their customers (risk selection). This implies a move towards the
perfect information equilibrium (C,,,CL). Since risk selection causes
additional administrative costs for the insurer it will, however, always lead
to higher premiums than in a situation with perfect information.
ITie better insurers are able to distinguish high from low risks, the more the
efficiency problem of adverse selection turns into an equity problem of risk
selection where price discrimination prevails, preventing poorer people with
significant health risks from buying insurance and possibly leading to a
screening-out of high-risk groups (such as the aged) or certain conditions
(such as chronical illnesses). Such kind of selection bias is, for example,
regarded as an important reason for the incomplete insurance coverage in the
United States, where 37 million people, or about 15 percent of the























Y\ " income when working (minus contributions in case of insurance)
Y% income when sick
E equilibrium in the no-insurance case for both low- and high-risk individuals
45°-line locus of full insurance contracts
CnE,CiE zero-profit lines of the insurance company for high- and low-risk
individuals respectively
AE ;•• • zero-profit line when risks have to be pooled because they cannot be
distinguished
UL,Uu indifference curves which are flatter for high-risk individuals because they
accept a reduction in insurance coverage only in exchange for large
reductions in contributionsThe state has two basic options to deal with adverse selection and risk
selection. The system employed in most OECD countries and a number of
middle-income countries (e.g. Brazil, Turkey and Costa Rica) is a mandated
social insurance with more or less uniform premiums independent of risk
status which fully eliminates adverse selection and price discrimination. The
same is true for arrangements like in Sweden, Norway and the United
Kingdom where health care is financed out of general taxes. The only
marked difference between social insurance and tax finance is that payroll
contributions are usually proportional while direct taxes, at least in high-
income countries, are progressive. The main disadvantage of social health
insurance and tax finance is that it implies a large redistribution from low- to
high-risk individuals. As a consequence, the former regard a substantial part
of their contributions as true income taxes which may adversely affect their
incentive to participate in the formal labor market.
A less intrusive second option is to regulate private insurance. Regulation
would include compulsory membership and minimum standards of coverage
in order to prevent good risks from opting out and free-riders from remaining
underinsured because they hope to be bailed out by the state in case of a
costly illness. Then the problem of non-insurable risks and the poor remains
to be solved. Regulation could forbid insurance companies to withhold cover10
from high-risk individuals and limit the extent of price discrimination. The
extent of risk selection could be further reduced by prohibiting insurers from
rating individuals' health risk and requiring them to rate only groups in which
high risks are spread over a larger number of people. Alternatively, the state
could let the private insurance market work freely and support high risks and
the poor directly, by subsidizing insurance premiums, or by paying the cost
of treatment through a residual public insurance scheme or out of tax
revenues.
In assessing the private and social insurance options, the efficiency
advantages of the former, namely the closer relationship between premiums
and expected health expenditures and the competition between insurers,
have to be weighed against the equity losses in terms of higher risk
selection. The government thus has to deal with an efficiency-equity trade
off. How strongly the two options differ depends on the relative weight of
adverse selection and risk selection. If insurers are perfectly able to
distinguish between risks the efficiency advantages of private insurance are
largest, but at the expense of strong price discrimination. If, on the other
hand, adverse selection dominates both options are inefficient in that low
risks subsidize high risks because the latter enjoy an information advantage.11
The second problem of health insurance, moral hazard, concerns both
publicly and privately managed systems. It can arise in two different ways.
First, insured individuals have an incentive to increase the probability of
requiring medical care by taking fewer precautions because they do not pay
the full cost of treatment. Such behavior which leads to overconsumption of
health care forces insurers to raise premiums. As a consequence, good risks
may opt out just like in the case of adverse selection. Second, there is the
so-called third-party payment problem which has two sources: the fact that
the insurance company has no influence on the decisions of doctor and
patient, and the fact that the doctor is paid a fee for each service delivered, a
common practice in many countries (Barr 1993). If medical insurance covers
all costs, health care is "free" to the patient and the supplier is not
constrained by the patient's ability to pay. Patient and doctor both face zero
private costs of health care and thus have an incentive to consume all health
care which yields any private benefit. Again, the result is overconsumption.
This tendency is likely to be reinforced because of asymmetric information
between doctor and patient. Patients may accept treatments they would not
buy if fully informed, but which are advantageous to medical professionals
(Musgrove 1996).12
2. Cost Containment
Beside the possible insurance'market failure due to asymmetric information,
excessive costs have become a further problem of the health sector in a
number of OECD countries and some middle-income countries. Four main
reasons are mentioned in the literature (see e.g. Musgrove 1996) why health
care costs may exceed their optimal levels. First, overconsumption resulting
from moral hazard obviously drives up costs. Of particular importance in
this respect is the third-party-payment problem which does not only lead to
higher than optimal costs in each single period but also to growing
expenditures overtime. This is due to the fact that if insurers rely on open-
ended fee-for-service compensation of providers, i.e. if providers face no
budget constraint, there is an incentive to make excessive use of new
equipment, drugs and procedures. Korea and the United States are examples
where open ended fee-for-service systems correspond with exploding health
expenditures. In Korea, the share of GNP devoted to health rose from 3.7
percent in 1980 to 6.6 percent in 1990, in the United States it rose from 9.4
to 12.7 percent (World Bank 1993).
Devices to contain costs arising from moral hazard can affect the demand
side and, in case of the third-party-payment problem, also the supply side offnstih>u f" - *• *
the health system (Ellis and McGuire 1993). On the demand side, the insurer
can limit coverage for the individual through deductibles (where the insured
pays the first X $ of any claim) and copayments (where the insured person
pays X percent of any claim). Both devices reduce the demand for treatment,
but they are not fully effective in containing cost. Deductibles are a means to
exclude small claims which usually have a high administrative cost
component, but they do nothing to face individuals with marginal cost of
more expensive treatment; and with a copayment rate of, say, 20 percent the
patient's private marginal cost is still only 20 percent of the marginal.social
cost.
On the supply side, one way of reducing the third-party-payment problem
are arrangements under which providers also act as insurers and assume the
risk. This controls cost by forcing doctors to face the social marginal cost of
the treatment they prescribe. The most outstanding example of this approach
are the health maintenance organizations in the United States (Barr 1993).
These organizations consist of a group of doctors who receive contributions
from their patients and in return provide primary care themselves and buy in
and monitor hospital care as necessary. Any surplus can be distributed to the
doctors as additional income or to the members in the form of lower
contributions or used to improve the service of the organization. Evidence14
(e.g. Manning et al. 1984) suggests that health maintenance organizations
have reduced medical costs by between 10 and 40 percent in comparison
with fee-for-service medicine. • ;
The main disadvantage of health maintenance organizations is that doctors
have a strong incentive to accept only good risks or to underservice patients
because they are paid according to a capitated system, receiving a fixed
amount of money for each patient (Table 3). Similar problems arise when
doctors receive fixed salaries. Under both payment mechanisms, cost
containment is achieved at the expense of medical supply. Rewarding
providers according to the diagnosis of their patients represents a payment
method that tries to balance the objectives of cost control and positive
supply incentives.
A second cause of excessive costs in the health sector which is undisputed
in the literature is the subsidization of insurance. Subsidies are widespread
and large in both private and public insurance schemes. They take the form
of both direct budgetary transfers to insurance institutions and tax
concessions for employers' and employees' insurance contributions
(Musgrove 1996). In addition to driving up costs, in middle-income15
countries where insurance coverage is mostly limited to the formal labor
force such subsidies benefit the better-off and are therefore regressive.
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Source: Adapted from World Bank (1993).16
;Third, high administrative costs resulting from large numbers of insurers
reimbursing providers at different rates are often regarded as a further reason
for inefficiently high health spending (see e.g. World Bank 1993). The
United States and Korea are again cases in point. There, administrative costs
absorb more than 10 percent of health expenditures, compared with 5
percent or less in other OECD countries (ibid.). Administrative costs are,
however, not necessarily true deadweight losses, because choice in health
insurance may be desirable for consumers with heterogeneous tastes even if
this generates additional costs (Besley and Gouyeia 1994).
Finally, competition between providers could be an additional option to
avoid cost escalation and to increase efficiency in the health sector (Lai
1994). However, as long as consumers do not bear at least part of the costs
of health care and as long as they are largely unable to judge the quality of
specific health services, there will be no competition in prices or quality.
Then, providers could try to attract patients by the amount of services
offered which would lead to additional cost increases. Competition will thus
only have the intended effects if there is some cost sharing and if consumers
are sufficiently informed about health care. A reduction of the information
asymmetry between providers and consumers can partly be achieved
privately, e.g. by reading health magazines. But there is also a role for the17
government in regulating the quality of health care, e.g. by requiring
minimum qualifications for doctors or by approving new drugs.
3. The Case of Chile
The Chilean government's reforms of the health-care system, which started
in 1975, had two main objectives: to improve the targeting of primary health
services and food supplements to the needy and to increase the efficiency of
the system itself (Castafleda 1992).
2
As a central measure to make the health system more efficient the
establishment of private insurance funds was encouraged, to which members
of the existing social insurance scheme can shift their payroll deductions.
The growth of private insurance funds has been substantial. Ten years after
their start in 1981, they covered about 20 percent of the population.3 The
success of the private insurance funds has not only promoted competition at
the insurance level, but it has also caused new private health providers to
emerge. These private providers do not exclusively serve the privately
The first objective will not be discussed here.
Adding the 65 percent of the population who are still members of the national
insurance and the 5 percent participating in an insurance run by the military, aggregate
coverage is around 90 percent, a very high figure for a middle-income country.18
insured. Publicly insured people also have the option of consuming private
health care if they are ready to pay varying levels of copayments. About 10
to 15 percent of the population make regularly use of this option (Marquez
1995).
Two major weaknesses of the reforms have endangered their overall success
(Marquez 1995). First, private insurance funds have undertaken a very strict
risk selection, denying coverage for certain medical services and for pre-
existing conditions and providing almost no access for the elderly. As a
result, the risk profile of the public insurance has gradually been worsened.
This has created equity problems because private patients receive much
better treatment than patients in the public system. Second, measures to
contain costs have been insufficient. Cost sharing has been limited to the
demand side, while health-care providers have been paid on a fee-for-
service basis. Heavy subsidization of private and public insurance through
tax deductions and direct government transfers has reinforced the pressure
on health-care costs. As a result, public health expenditures slightly
increased from 2.2 to 2.6 percent of GDP between 1980 and 1993, despite
the growing importance of the private sector.19
Government initiatives to deal with these problems have recently come
underway (ibid.)- hi the early 1990s, legislation was enacted to strengthen
regulation over the private insurance funds. Among other things, this
legislation prohibits the unilateral termination of contracts and obliges the
insurance funds to offer certain preventive services such as well child care.
Further regulations are currently planned, e.g. to restrict exclusions
permitted for certain services, to prescribe the formation of risk groups
instead of individual risk-rating, and to regulate the coverage of pre-existing
conditions. With these corrections, larger parts of the population would gain
access to private insurance, possibly leaving only a residual role for the
public system. Cost containment is to be improved by replacing the fee-for-
service resource allocation mechanisms with fixed diagnostic-related
payments for hospitals and a capitated system for primary health care
facilities.^ It is also considered to eliminate the existing tax concessions for
employers' contributions to insurance.
In sum, if the planned refinements of the reforms are put into practice,
Chile's health insurance will receive a stronger equity component.
Nevertheless, by encouraging an increasing participation of the private
4 For the strengths and weaknesses of these payment mechanisms sec Table 3.20
sector and allowing for a significant degree of price discrimination, the
Chilean government will still lay strong emphasis on efficiency compared to
most other countries.
in. PENSIONS
It is a general phenomenon that people try to smooth consumption over
lifetime by saving in their active period and dissaving during retirement, but
the mechanisms for doing so differ in different parts of the world. More than
half of the world's old people, the majority of them living in Africa and
South Asia, rely on informal and traditional arrangements for income
security based on the extended family or the community (World Bank 1994).
When economic development proceeds, such features as increased
urbanization and mobility tend to weaken these informal ties. Formal
arrangements then appear as substitutes, mainly in the form of public
peasion schemes. As Table 4 shows, public pension coverage and public
pension spending steeply increase with rising per capita income. In the
upper-middle and high-income countries, pension spending has clearly
overtaken public expenditures on health or education. Governments in high-
income countries, for example, spend on average 5.5 percent of their GDP
on health (Table 1), compared to 8.2 percent on pensions (Table 4).21
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aUnweighted country averages for years between 1985 and 1992. Numbers in
parenthesis indicate number of countries for which data were available.
Source: World Bank (1994).
1. The Rationale for Government Intervention
While the erosion of informal old age security arrangements in the course of
economic development can be expected, it remains to be explained why they
usually have been replaced by public schemes and not by formal market
arrangements. Market failure in the process of reallocating consumption
over lifetime could be one reason. If individuals are risk averse, they have an
incentive to insure against certain income risks which may appear in this
process. The following income risks can be distinguished (Diamond 1977):
(i) the risk of a lower-than-expected real return on savings in the active
period;22
(ii) the risk of a lower-than-expected real return on the accumulated savings
during retirement;
(iii) the risk of a shorter-than-expected duration of the active period, e.g.
: because of illness;
(iv) the risk of a longer-than-expected retirement.
All these risks imply that the wealth accumulated in the active period may
not be sufficient to sustain the desired living standard during retirement. The
first two kinds of problems are first of all a consequence of unexpected
inflation (Barr 1993). Inflation risks are best kept under control by a sound
monetary policy, possibly complemented by issuing indexed bonds.
Remaining risks of variations in the real returns on savings in the active
period can be lowered by diversifying the portfolio between different assets
and countries. In order to avoid that large amounts of savings are wiped out,
e.g. because pension funds go bankrupt, the government has the possibility
to guarantee the deposits. This could, however, encourage moral hazard
because riskier investments are chosen when the government is ready to
compensate losses. A superior alternative would be to establish a
reinsurance system to which pension funds pay contributions dependent on
the volume and riskiness of their portfolio (Heinrich et al. 1996: 121). Since23
higher risks are reflected in higher premiums, a reinsurance prevents
distortions towards too risky investments.
The risks of longer-than-expected retirement and shorter-than-expected
active periods require insurance. With voluntary insurance, moral hazard and
adverse selection could lead to market imperfections. Obviously, this is not
the case with respect to longevity. Moral hazard is not a problem as
committing suicide is "costly" to the individual and, in addition, works in the
insurance company's favor. Nor are there severe problems of adverse
selection because people do not know when they are going to die. They
might, of course, know that their life expectancy as, say, mining workers is
lower than that of civil servants, but this does not create an information
asymmetry as it is known by insurers as well. There is thus no reason why
insurance companies should not offer annuities based on the average life
expectancy of different occupational groups which would not only insure
against longevity but also guarantee a smooth income stream during
retirement. Markets for annuities have indeed evolved in countries like Chile
(Vittas 1995) where pension funds play a major role.
Disability insurances that deal with the risk of a shorter-than-expected
working life are more likely to suffer from information asymmetries, in24
particular from moral hazard, i.e. from the tendency that individuals more
frequently withdraw from the labor force than without insurance. This
behavior can be limited by coinsurance arrangements and controls to check
the state of health of the insured. If moral hazard is nonetheless so strong
that a number of insured with lower risks opt out because of rising
premiums, the government has - analogous to the case of health insurance -
the choice between making private insurance compulsory or establishing a
social disability insurance. The decision depends on whether it accepts a
selection of risks, i.e. for example significantly higher premiums for mining
workers than for civil servants.
Altogether, with the possible exception of disability insurance, market
failure alone does not provide very compelling reasons for the large amounts
of forced savings characterizing old age security systems in so many
countries. The case for compulsory pension schemes is, however,
strengthened by a paternalistic argument. According to this reasoning, many
people don't save enough for their retirement, either because they behave
opportunistically and hope for a bail-out by society, or because they are
myopic and do not foresee the distant future (Kitterer and Seidl 1988). Such
undersaving can be prevented by mandating a certain savings rate for old
age security. A final explanation for government intervention in old age25
security is redistributive. The state may wish to transfer income to those
old-aged who were not able to save enough during their working life, which
does, however, not necessarily require a system of forced savings (see
below). ...•,-
2. Pay-As-You-Go Versus Funded Schemes
If the government regards some forced savings for old-age security as
necessary it has to decide whether the pension scheme should be organized
as a funded system, i.e. with individual accounts for pension saving, or on a
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) basis where current pensions are financed by
current worker contributions. Funded systems are supposed to have three
main advantages compared to PAYG systems which show up in higher
economic growth (Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel 1995): more saving, higher
formal-sector employment, and the development of capital markets.
Proponents of PAYG systems regard as their main advantages that they
allow for a redistributive component and exhibit substantially lower
administrative costs than funded systems and that they do not depend on
volatile capital markets (e.g. Barr 1993). Moreover, the authors point
towards the inconclusive evidence in favor of positive growth effects of
funded systems.26
In assessing the impact of different pension schemes on savings, the life
cycle model (Ando and Modigliani 1963) usually serves as a framework.
Starting from a situation with no mandatory savings and assuming a
distortion-free economy, the introduction of a funded system would simply
have the result that people substitute pension contributions for their own
saving, leaving net savings unaffected (Munnell 1985). In a PAYG system,
generations which are retired or close to retirement at the time social
security benefits are introduced, receive windfalls which induce them to
consume more and save less (Kotlikoff 1996). For later generations of
workers who enter the labor force after the introduction of the social security
system, there will be little impact on lifetime resources and savings,
provided that the system is actuarially fair, i.e. that payroll taxes in present
value terms equal the benefits received in retirement. For a PAYG system to
be actuarially fair, its "biological" return, i.e. the sum of the population
growth rate and the growth rate of real wages, must be equal to the real
interest rate (Aaron 1966). If this condition holds workers of later
generations will reduce their private savings by the amount of their social
security contributions, but subsequent benefits will also reduce the dissaving
required to support retirement consumption, leaving lifetime savings
constant. On balance, the life cycle model thus predicts that a PAYG system27
lowers savings compared to a funded or a voluntary system, but that this
effect is petering out when the system matures, i.e. when the windfalls of
early generations disappear. In reality, the negative impact of a PAYG
system on savings is likely to be somewhat dampened by the fact that
"biological" returns tend to be lower than real interest rates so that later
generations have an incentive to consume less and save more over lifetime.5
Extensions of the basic life cycle model lead to somewhat different results.
There are at least three additional effects which may imply higher savings in
both funded and PAYG systems. First, pensions may induce workers to
retire earlier than they otherwise would (Feldstein 1974). This increases
savings compared to the life cycle model with exogenous retirement age
because people who retire early are forced to save at a higher rate over a
shorter working life in order to finance a longer retirement. If income per
capita rises, the amount saved by workers then exceeds the amount dissaved
by retirees. Second, if people are myopic or if their preferences are such that
they voluntarily save less than the pension scheme requires, private savings
will not be reduced to the full extent of pension contributions. Third, pension
Kotlikoff (1996), for example, estimates that in the United States the "biological"
return was only one third of the rate of return from investing in the market during the
last 35 years.28
rights are a very illiquid form of saving. Therefore, they will not fully
substitute voluntary savings. A further extension of the life cycle model
emphasizes altruistic behavior between generations (Barro 1974). Barro
argues that if a PAYG social security system is introduced, there will be
offsetting intrafamily transfers, e.g. reduced support for elderly parents. If
altruism is complete, i.e. if Ricardian equivalence between social and
intrafamily transfers holds, a social security system will have no impact on
savings as it simply implies a rearrangement of transfers between
generations.
Overall, the impact of pension schemes on savings is theoretically
indeterminate. Most empirical studies detect a moderately positive effect of
funded systems on savings (Munnell 1985). For PAYG-systems, the
evidence is less conclusive. While recent studies by Feldstein (1996) for the
United States and Edwards (1995) for a cross-section of 36 countries found
a negative effect, a number of previous investigations provided no indication
that public pensions have adversely affected private saving (Munnell 1985).
Tests of Ricardian equivalence have shown that social security benefits only
partly crowd out private transfers (Cox and Jimenez 1989; Altonji et al.
1992). Cox and Jimenez, for example, found that private transfers from29
young :to old in Peru would have been 20 percent higher without social
security benefits. ,; ,.„:
The impact of PAYG and funded systems on labor supply would be
equivalent if the PAYG system was actuarially fair. There are, however, two
reasons why the return on PAYG contributions differs from the market real
interest rate. First, as mentioned before, the "biological" return is typically
lower than the real return on capital. Second, while the "biological" return
determinates the average return on PAYG contributions, the return for each
individual worker deviates from the average because PAYG pensions often
include a component - unrelated to contributions - that redistributes income
within cohorts. Hence, PAYG schemes are in general actuarially unfair from
the point of view of individual workers. They contain a pure tax component,
i.e. a part of the payroll tax which is not matched by expected future
benefits, so that there is an incentive to reduce labor supply or to move into
the informal sector. For Chile and Colombia, for example, the pure tax
component before the introduction of funded systems has been estimated to
be as high as 16 and 13 to 16 percent respectively (Schmidt-Hebbel 1995).
In many DCs, the perceived link between premiums and benefits is further
weakened by the fact that the future benefits are regarded as very uncertain,
particularly because experience shows that benefits are often eroded by30
inflation (World Bank 1994). Empirical studies, which have been limited to
developed countries, provide weak evidence that existing PAYG systems
have reduced labor supply (Danziger et al. 1981). This effect is likely to be
stronger in DCs where the link between contributions and benefits tends to
be weaker.
Positive growth effects of funded systems through the development of
capital markets can in particular be expected in developing countries where
financial deepening is still low. Until now, the hypothesis has not been
tested empirically. There are only some theoretical considerations, e.g. that
financial market development raises capital productivity (Roubini and Sala-i-
Martin 1992), and the empirical observation that in Chile the introduction of
a funded system was closely associated with an enormous growth of capital
markets (see below).'
Chile's experience may also serve proponents of PAYG systems as an
example of how risky investment of pension contributions in capital markets
can be. Just after the establishment of the funded system in 1981, a severe
financial crisis endangered the existence of most pension funds. The state
temporarily nationalized two of them in order to avoid huge losses for
savers. The development after this crisis, by contrast, illustrates that pension31
funds in DCs can perform sufficiently well to provide savers with secure
investment opportunities. Tighter regulations of capital markets are. usually
mentjoned as a main reason for the improved performance after the financial
crisis (e.gr Queisser 1993),but it still remains to be systematically analyzed
how a regulatory framework for pension fund investment should look like.
The other stated advantages of PAYG systems, namely lower transaction
costs and the possibility of redistribution, are only at first sight very
compelling. According to international cost comparisons administrative
costs of public schemes lie between 2 and 3 percent of contributions*
compared to a range of 10 to 30 percent in privately managed schemes
(Kitterer and Seidl 1988). The cost differentials are, however, mainly due to
expenses for acquisition and advertisement in competitive private markets.
Whether these costs are matched by the possibility for consumers to choose
between different offers is an unsettled question.
Redistribution is taking place on a large scale within PAYG systems,
particularly in DCs. But as a comprehensive study of old .age security in
DCs shows (World Bank 1994), redistribution is in most cases extremely
intransparent. This intransparency facilitates lobbying by higher-income32
groups which often makes redistribution regressive.
6 Since the financing of
income transfers out of contributions has the further disadvantage that it
weakens the link between contributions and benefits, it is superior to support
the old-age poor out of general taxes. Redistribution towards poor retirees
can take the form of means-tested or flat benefits. Means-tested benefits
redistribute to the poor more efficiently because they are targeted towards
the needy, but they are administratively costly and impose high marginal tax
rates on the recipient's savings and thus provide an incentive for poor people
near the income threshold not to save at all. Flat benefits, by contrast, incur
lower administrative costs and avoid perverse incentive effects, but they
require higher tax rates as the group of recipients is larger. Whether means-
tested or flat benefits should be employed depends on country
characteristics, e.g. on the administrative capacity to conduct regular income
tests.
If governments want to maintain some redistribution towards the old age
poor, and if they finance it out of taxes there is no reason why it should not
Lobbying is not the only reason why public social security programs have adverse
redistributional effects. Another important reason is that the first people to be covered
when new plans are started are usually middle- and upper-income groups who
typically receive large transfers (World Bank 1994).33
be combined with an actuarially fair funded system for pensions above a
minimum level. By disentangling the two objectives of old age security -
insurance and income smoothing on the one hand and redistribution on the
other hand - such a two pillar system would at least greatly enhance
transparency and possibly also lead to a more progressive redistribution and
higher growth. A two pillar system with well-targeted transfers can, of
course, also be established on a PAYG basis so that the superiority of a
funded pension scheme solely hinges on its expected growth effects.
Independent of whether pensions are organized on a funded or PAYG basis,
redistribution alone does not provide a justification for forced savings
because support to the old-age poor could as well be integrated, into the
general tax and transfer system. , .
3. The Case of Chile
Chile was the first country that introduced a two pillar system in 1981.
Recently, it was followed by Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. All
these countries had to manage a transition from their old PAYG system.
There are two basic ways to finance this transition. The first choice would
be to transform the implicit PAYG debt into explicit debt. Financing the
pension reform in this way does not change the government's net asset34
position and hence does not shift income across different generations,
leaving their wealth and saving levels unaltered (Schmidt-Hebbel 1995).
Paying interest on the now explicit debt will, however, lay a slight burden on
all future generations provided that the bonds have an infinite duration.^ The
second way of government financing is through fiscal contraction, i.e. by
raising taxes or cutting government expenditures. This choice imposes an
income loss on all transition generations that have to pay for higher taxes or
that suffer from lower government spending, i.e. it implies a redistribution
between generations. Chile implemented a combination of both strategies.
Fiscal contraction, particularly in the form of lower government
expenditures, was used to pay the current pensions guaranteed by the old
system, while bonds were issued for those who had accumulated pension
rights under the old system. To build up the new system, workers are
required to put at least 10 percent of their salaries into one of several
competing privately managed pension funds (Holzmann 1996).
An assessment of Chile's pension reform appears to be difficult because it
was only part of a much larger restructuring. Most clear-cut are die
' Bonds with an infinite duration minimize the welfare losses by dividing the burden of
transition equally between all future generations.35
redistributional effects. In the old system, a high degree of discrimination
existed between the numerous pension institutions, mainly at the expense, of
poorer blue-collar workers and in favor of (rich and poor) public employees
(Castaneda 1992). Under the new system,, transfers are well targeted to
those who, were not able to save enough during their working life. These old
age poor receive a minimum pension, the difference between accumulated
savings and pension benefits being financed out of taxes. The minimum
pension guarantee is a,variant of a means-tested benefit, but it eliminates
transaction costs because it is automatic and based on records maintained by
the mandatory saving scheme, and it minimizes negative effects on savings.
Since the Chilean pension scheme covers more than 85 percent of the
employed, the minimum pension guarantee reaches most of the old age poor.
The only major exception are the low-income self-employed, who can
participate voluntarily in the pension system but rarely do so (Queisser
1993). The self-employed poor are entitled to a means-tested social
allowance which is, however, substantially lower than the minimum pension
guarantee. ;,,......
It is also likely that Chile's pension reforms have improved the efficiency of
labor and capital markets. The pure tax component of pension contributions
has been reduced from 16 percent in 1980 to 2 percent in 1992 (Corsetti and36
Schmidt-Hebbel 1995). Even at modest labor supply elasticities this.would
imply a gain in formal employment. Capital markets have grown
enormously, particularly since 1985 when pension funds were allowed to
invest in equities for the first time. Between 1984 and 1993, stock market
capitalization sharply rose from 11 to 102 percent of GDP (Vittas 1995).
The pension funds have played an instrumental role in the privatization of
several utilities and in developing the market for mortgage and corporate
bonds. For some financial instruments, their quantitative impact is very
large. In 1994, pension funds represented, for example, 62 percent of all
mortgage bonds. The good performance of the Chilean pension funds is also
reflected in high real returns on investment (Table 5). Similarly high returns
were only earned by other privately managed pension funds in some OECD
countries. The state-owned provident funds in Singapore and Malaysia,
which are required to invest in government securities and face no
competition, earned significantly lower returns. In countries like Zambia and
Peru publicly managed pension schemes even wiped out large parts of
people's savings, because accumulated funds were not indexed to inflation.
These examples indicate that macroeconomic stability is an important
precondition for funded schemes to work properly.37




































Source: World Bank (1994).
Chile's pension funds would probably even fare better, if their investments
were not heavily regulated by the state. Pension funds are, for example, not
allowed to invest more than 30 percent of their assets in equities (Vittas
1995). One reason for these regulations is that the state guarantees a
minimum return to the pension contributions of workers and thus wants to
prevent pension funds from undertaking too many risky investments. As
mentioned above, a reinsurance scheme possibly is a more adequate
regulatory framework because it does not distort investment decisions. It
does, however, only prevent large losses for savers while variations in real38
returns on savings are not restricted so that the individual faces higher
investment risks. The open question is how much risk savers are ready to
accept as a "price" for higher average returns in a funded system.
The existing regulation of investments also appears to be one factor behind
the high administrative cost of Chile's pension funds, which lie between 15
and 30 percent of contributions (ibid.). Since the pension funds have rather
similar portfolios there is no strong price competition and, as a consequence,
large amounts are paid on advertisement in order to gain new customers.
The reform's impact on savings is the most difficult one to assess. Holzmann
(1996) argues that the direct impact of the pension funds on domestic
savings was negative between 1981 and 1988 and positive thereafter (Figure
2). He obtains these results by adding up the money flowing into the
individual pension accounts and subtracting the transitional losses of savings
due to the reform, i.e. the public spending necessary to provide pensions to
persons who retired under the old system and the cost of compensating
workers who already paid contributions into the old system. The figures do
not account for the fact that Chile financed part of the transition costs by
cutting public expenditures which increased the budget surplus and thus
fuelled public savings.39
In sum, the existing evidence suggests, ihat Chile has benefited from the;
transition to a funded system, both in equity and efficiency terms, although it
remains to be seen whether the high returns on savings can be sustained in
the future. A more rigorous assessment of the reform's welfare implications
can only be achieved in a modelling framework, e.g. by means of
simulations in an overlapping generations model.
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IV. SUMMARY AND OPEN QUESTIONS
This paper analyzed the justification for government interventions in health
and old age insurance and compared the theoretical considerations with
actual performance, in particular with the situation in Chile after the social
sector reforms in the 1980s. It was shown that health insurances tend to
suffer from adverse selection and risk selection as well as from moral
hazard. In dealing with adverse selection and risk selection, governments
have to choose between two basic options, thereby facing an equity-
efficiency trade-off. If they put a high weight on equity in health care, like in
most OECD countries and some middle-income countries, social insurance
where premiums do not vary according to health risks is usually preferred.
However, such an arrangement is bought at efficiency costs in terms of work
disincentives for low-risk individuals. Where efficiency receives a higher
weight, e.g. in Chile or the United States, regulated private insurance which
leaves room for price discrimination between high and low risks is regarded
as the superior alternative. The second problem of health insurance, moral
hazard, arises in both private and public schemes. It can be reduced, but not
eliminated, by means of various supply and demand side cost-sharing
mechanisms.41
With respect to old age security, insurance market failures do not provide a
strong rationale for, the system of forced savings prevailing worldwide, The
same is true for redistributional objectives which could as well be achieved
through the general tax and transfer system. The case for forced savings
mainly relies on the hypothesis that people tend to undersave for retirement.
If one comes to the conclusion that forced savings are necessary, funded
systems seem to have advantages over PAYG systems in that they improve
efficiency as the case of Chile illustrates. There may, however, be a second-
best argument in favor of PAYG pensions where severe capital market
failures exist which for some reason cannot be corrected.
A more clear-cut assessment of the different policy options requires answers
to some yet unresolved questions. First, the intensity of the equity-efficiency
trade-off in health insurance depends on the (unknown) relative weights of
adverse selection and risk selection. As long as adverse selection dominates,
price discrimination is limited by the existing information asymmetry so that
the difference between private and public insurance is only small. Possible
efficiency gains of private insurance rise with the importance of risk
selection. Second, it is important to obtain evidence on the extent of
undersaving because it is a main determinant of the relative merits of
voluntary and forced savings for retirement. Third, when arguing in favor of42
individual saving accounts for old age security, it has yet to be demonstrated
that under certain sets of regulations pension funds perform sufficiently well
to provide risk averse savers with reasonable investment opportunities.
Finally, the decision to reform existing pension schemes depends on the
welfare effects of the transition from a PAYG to a funded system. Numerical
welfare calculations which could support this decision are until now limited
to a few OECD countries. Similar studies for middle-income countries
would possibly provide new valuable insights.43
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